Notebook #14: Israel-Turkey-Syria, and why Ahmet Kaya went to jail

Also, my FPRI essay, Turkey-Israel, Steve Cook's take, municipal takeovers

This is a weekly post where I talk about the things I’ve been reading and watching, as well as share pieces of analysis relating to Turkish politics.

The first item is for free, the rest is for paid subscribers only.

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Reminder: My book, New Turkey and the Far Right: How Reactionary Nationalism Remade a Country is coming out on February 20!

You can pre-order your copy wherever you get your books!

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A new essay on Turkish-American relations

I have a new essay out at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). In it, I divide Turkish foreign policy under Erdoğan into three distinct eras, and use that as a base to think about the future of Turkey-U.S. relations. I predict that relations are probably going to improve in the near future, but that their political and strategic divergences will continue to deepen.

I wrote the first version of this thing before the U.S. elections, and that included a section on how the Harris people saw Turkey. I’m glad I don’t need that part anymore because frankly, it was a bit boring. The Democratic establishment just thought that “Erdoğan” was a bit of a bully, but that he was a bully that “we can do business with”.

I think the Trump people have a more colorful approach. They either think that Turkey is exactly the muscular kind of ally they need, or they think that it’s an Islamist terror state that should be dealt with right after Iran. They’re definitely more interesting to write about.

Anyways, I was late with the text, and then it got bumped during the holidays, but I’m glad it’s out now. Give it a read, let me know what you think!

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Israel-Turkey rivalry begins to sharpen

I’d like to follow up on some things I’ve been writing about the Turkey-Israel relationship and regional order.

In Israel, there is apparently a body called the Nagel Committee, which brings together senior people to make recommendations on the long-term direction of the country’s defense budget. In its last meeting, the committee discussed the potential of war with Turkey, and suggested a significant increase in defense spending over the next decade.

I don’t know how more popular Israeli outlets see Turkey these days, but I imagine they’re pretty adversarial. On Turkish TV and newspaper commentary, people saw the Nigel report as confirmation that the Israelis reciprocate feelings of enmity.

Israeli experts and “track two” people have been cautioning against that kind of interpretation. Gallia Lindenstrauss was recently on Amberin Zaman’s podcast to put this into context. I also read commentary by people like Gabi Mitchell who lament the “lack of communication” between Turkish and Israeli officials and express hope that things might improve.

I understand that sentiment, and sympathize. Unfortunately, I don’t think that the problem between our countries is due to a lack of communication.

Sometimes talking to officials too much can be counterproductive. Sometimes the people in power have an interest in being vague about their long-term intentions. After October 7, the Erdoğan government’s reaction was pretty tame. Many liberals thought that this was good, and many Islamists were distraught.

I argued at the time that Turkey’s long-term commitment to the Palestinian cause continued. Ankara was serious about the struggle, it just judged that it wasn’t prudent to come out very strongly against the war at that point in time. Turkey had a new foreign policy and economics team, had set a course of rebuilding international trust, and the Gaza war just rocked that boat too much. Commentators who are deeply integrated with the presidential palace simply dropped hints that Turkey’s commitment to Hamas ran very deep, and mostly occurred in secret.

Here’s my commentary from that time.

Erdoğan has been consistent on Gaza

And my follow-up to that piece, in which I doubled down on my analysis, adding that the Western world had failed to rein in Israel, and that relative Israeli power would be seriously diminished in the not-too-distant future.

Dear Western World: please try not to self-destruct

With Assad’s fall, I think it has become more clear what has been happening with Turkey’s southern strategy.

One thing to keep in mind on Turkey’s approach here: this isn’t an “ideological” issue for Ankara. By that I mean that Turkish leaders won’t necessarily think of the Palestinian cause as a moral issue that Turkey should pursue despite its commercial and/or diplomatic interests. That might have been the case for some Western leaders, but it isn’t for Turkey.

For Turkey, the Palestinian cause aligns with the country’s broader regional interests. It makes sense to pursue it precisely because it makes strategic, commercial, and political sense — not always in the short term, and not always in every arena — but it does. There are tens of millions of people south of the border, and Turkey can build a political connection with them partially through the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Islamists then think that these populations can be hooked up into the Turkish economy, re-aligned in an Islamist/populist political formation, and brought under the umbrella of a Turkish-lead military structure. There are territorial waters to control, trade routes to secure, military bases to build, etc.

I think Turkey’s current foreign policy elites might have the experience and stamina to pursue that kind of objective. I’m just not sure about things 10-15 years down the line.